The Income Taxation of the Capital Gains of a Trust by Joyce, Kenneth F.
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
3-1-1968 
The Income Taxation of the Capital Gains of a Trust 
Kenneth F. Joyce 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth F. Joyce, The Income Taxation of the Capital Gains of a Trust, 23 Tax L. Rev. 361 (1968). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/836 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
The Income Taxation of the Capital
Gains of a Trust
KENNETH F. JOYOE *
T m Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does not purport to ansver
directly the question of who pays the tax on capital gains realized
by a trust. Under the scheme of the Code, the critical question
is whether a given capital gain is included in the distributable net
income of the trust, since it is the trust's distributable net income
which measures the maximum amount includable in the gross in-
come of the beneficiaries (and deductible by the trust) by virtue of
distributions to the beneficiaries. Thus to the extent that capital
gains are excludable from distributable net income they are taxed
to the trust and not to the beneficiary.
Section 643 of the Code defines "distributable net income" as
the "taxable income" of the trust with certain "modifications."
The modification which concerns us is contained in section 643(a)
(3) which provides, pertinently:
Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall be excluded to
the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not... paid,
credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary during the
taxable year ....
The proper interpretation of this provision has been the subject
of considerable disagreement. For example, in a proposed
draft revision of the Code published by the American Law
Institute in 1956, it was suggested that section 643(a) (3) was
susceptible of four different interpretations which could lead to
four different results on the same set of facts.' In large part the
*Associate Professor of Law, State University of Now York at Buffalo. The author
acknowledges his indebtedness to his colleague, Professor Louis A. Del Cotto, for his
invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 ALJ, FED. INCoME. ESTATE AxD GI=i TAx STAT. 103-04 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956).
The cited example involved a corpus distribution in a year in which the trust hba a
capital gain. The four alternatives stated were:
"(1) The capital gain, though allocable to corpus, could be deemed to have been
distributea to the beneficiary in the form of the corpus distribution ....
"(2) The capital gain could be treated as having been allocated to corpus and
mot distributed to the beneficiary ....
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difficulty seems attributable to a lack of clear understanding of the
manner in which capital gains were treated under prior revenue
acts and to a consequent failure to view the present Code provi-
sions in their historical perspective. We shall begin, therefore, with
the past.
Although a trust was first made a separate taxable entity under
the Revenue Act of 1916,2 it was the 1924 act 3 which established
the present pattern of making the income taxable to the trust in
the first instance and allowing deductions to the trust with respect
to income distributable, or distributed, to the beneficiaries. The
provisions of the 1924 act were embodied in the 1939 Code and re-
mained substantially unchanged until 1942. The 1939 Code, as
amended in 1942, in turn remained substantially unchanged until
the 1954 Code. Accordingly, we will divide our consideration of
the taxation of the capital gains of trusts into the three periods,
i.e., (a) prior to 1942, governed by the original 1939 Code, (b)
1942 to 1954, governed by the 1939 Code, as amended in 1942, and
(c) 1954 to the present, governed by the 1954 Code.
Taxation of Capital Gains Prior to 1942
Section 161 of the 1939 Code divided the taxable income of trusts
(and estates) into four classes:
(1) income required to be accumulated;
(2) income required to be distributed currently; 4
(3) income received by estates of deceased persons during administra-
tion or settlement of the estate;(4) income which could be accumulated or distributed in the discre-
tion of the fiduciary.
Section 161 subjected all four classes of income to the same in-
come taxes imposed on individuals, including, therefore, the in-
come tax imposed on the realization of capital gains5
Section 162 determined whether the trust or the beneficiary was
" (3) The corpus distribution could be deemed to conist of capital gain in the
same proportion as the capital gain bears to the corpus . .
"(4) The last and probably least desirable alternative would be to construe the
statutory language as requiring a tracing of the distribution so as to includo the
gain in distributable net income only if the corpus distribution could be traced
to it."
2 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
3 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
4 This class also included imeome collected by a guardian of an infant subject to
court order.
r See I.R.C. § 22(a) (1989); Merchants' Loazm & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S.
509 (1921).
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to pay the tax, in the following way: Subdivision (b) of section
162 allowed the trustee to deduct, in determining the net income of
the trust, income of the second class, i.e., "the amount of the in-
come of the... trust for its taxable year which is to be distributed
currently by the fiduciary to the beneficiaries."I
Subdivision (c) of section 162 allowed the trustee to deduct so
much of the third and fourth classes of income as was "properly
paid or credited" to a legatee, heir, or beneficiary.(
Under both subdivision (b) and subdivision (c) of section 162,
the amount which the trust was allowed to deduct (whether de-
ducted or not) was includable by the beneficiaries in computing
their net income. Under subdivision (b), the currently distributable
amount was includable by the beneficiaries "whether distributed
to them or not," but under subdivision (c) the amount was in-
cludable by the beneficiaries only if it was "properly paid or cred-
ited" to them.
Although the scheme of these provisions seems fairly clear,
difficulty arose in their application due to their failure to recognize
and provide for the fact that the word "income" can refer to two
different concepts: (1) "tax income" denoting those items con-
sidered to be within the meaning of "gross income" as used in
the federal tax sense, and (2) "trust income," denoting those items
interpreted under local law to be comprehended by the word "in-
come" when used in a trust instrument to determine the amount
available for distribution to one class of beneficiaries (income
beneficiaries) as opposed to another class (remaindermen or corpus
beneficiaries).
No problem was presented in this respect where a particular
item was both tax income and trust income.7 If, for example, a
trust received ordinary dividends during its taxable year, the
amount would be tax income and also, absent a contrary provision
in the trust, trust income. If the trust provided for its income to
be distributed currently, section 162(b) would render the dividends
6Subdivision (ce) provided, in full:
In the case of income received by estates of deceased persons during the period
of administration or settlement of the estate, and in the case of income v'hich, in
the discretion of the iduciary, may be either distributed to the beneficiary or
accumulated, there shall be allowed as an additional deduction in computing the
met income of the estate or trust the amount of the ineomo of the estato or trust
for its taxable year, which is properly paid or credited during such year to any
legatee, heir, or beneficiary, but the amount so allowed as a deduction shall be
included in computing the net income of the legatee, heir, or beneficiary.
However, the trust's net tax income, aside from the section 102 deductions, might
still be different from its net trust income available for distribution because tax
deductions and trust deductions might not be the same.
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deductible by the trust and includable by the beneficiaries. The
same result would follow under section 162(c) if the trust provided
that the income was to be distributed or accumulated in the trustee's
discretion, and the trustee paid or credited the dividends to the
beneficiaries.
Difficulty arose, however, when an item which was tax income
was not trust income.' Such difficulty would be presented in two
situations: First, where the word "income" in the trust was con-
strued to exclude the item, and second, where, although the word
"income" was normally construed to include the item, the trust
either specifically provided for the item's exclusion from income or
gave the trustee discretion to include or exclude the item from
income and the trustee decided to exclude it from income and
add it to corpus.
Thus the problem arose with respect to capital gains which, al-
though within the tax income of the trust, were, as they are now,
ordinarily considered to be trust corpus-i.e., an accretion to
corpus-rather than trust income.' How, then, were such gains
treated under sections 162(b) and 162(c) ?
Recall that the amount deductible by the trust and taxable to
the beneficiaries was, under section 162(b), "the amount of the
income of the estate or trust for its taxable year which is to be
distributed currently by the fiduciary to the legatees, heirs, or
beneficiaries . . .", and under section 162(c), "the amount of the
income of the estate or trust for its taxable year, which is properly
paid or credited during such year to any legatee, heir, or benefi-
ciary.. ." (emphasis added).
Were capital gains within the meaning of the word "income"
which is italicized in these clauses of sections 162(b) and 162(c) 7
Or to ask the question another way, did that word "income"
comprehend all tax income regardless of whether it was also trust
income, or only tax income that was also trust income ?
Under section 162(b) the question was avoidable, and thus
avoided, for the following reason: To be deductible under section
162 (b), the amount had to be not only an "amount of income" but
also an amount "which is to be distributed currently." Whether an
amount was currently distributable, in turn, depended upon
a The converse situation was also presented, i.e., where an item was not tax income
but was considered truit income. See McCullough v. Comm'r, 153 F.2d 345 (2d Cir.
1946) ; Johnston v. Helvering, 141 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 715 (1944).
Such a situation is not, however, pertinent to this inquiry.
9 RESTATFmExT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 233 (1959); 3 ScoTn, TRUSTS § 233.1 (2d od.
1956); see I.R.C. § 643(a)(3) (1954).
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whether the beneficiary, under the instrument as interpreted by
local law, had the right to compel its distribution. 0 Because capital
gains were not ordinarily considered trust income under local law,
the beneficiary could not compel their distribution where the trust
provided for current distribution of its income, and consequently
they were neither deductible by the trust nor taxable to the bene-
ficiaries under section 162(b). Therefore, since the deduction under
section 162(b) was not allowable for capital gains for the reason
that they were not currently distributable, it was unnecessary to
determine whether the deduction was not allowable on the addi-
tional ground that the word "income" in section 162(b) meant only
items which were both tax income and trust income. Such was the
result, if not the precise rationale, of the cases which considered the
question.'
On the other hand, in a few cases the grantor of the trust was
held to have used the word "income," (or similar language such
as "income, proceeds, and profits"), as comprehending capital
gains, thus entitling the income beneficiary to a distribution of
the capital gains.' In these cases, the capital gains were held cur-
rently distributable and thus deductible by the trust and taxable
to the beneficiaries under section 162(b). Again, however, these
holdings did not involve a decision that the word "income" in sec-
tion 162(b) referred only to those items of tax income which were
also items of trust income, since the capital gains in question were
both tax income and trust income.1 3
The question of the meaning of the word "income" could not,
however, be avoided under section 162(c). Assume the following:
A trust provides that its income is to be paid to A for life and the
corpus transferred to B on A's death. It is expressly stated in
the trust instrument that the word "income" does not include
10 Comm'r v. Lewis, 141 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1944); Letts v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 760
(9th Cir. 1936); F'euler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934); LT. 3830, 1946-2 Ctns. BULL.
47.
ulMary Hadley Case, 8 T.C. 343 (1947); Judson v. United States, 15 F.Supp. 62
(Ct. Cl. 1936); Anna M. Chambers, 29 B.T.A. 971 (1934), aff'd, 77 F.2d 95 (3d Cir.
1935); see Randolph v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.), cc'tt. denid, 296 U.S. 599
(1935).
12 See Letts v. Comm'r, 84 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1936); Amy H. DuPuy, 32 B.T.A. 969
(1935).
:3 In Letts v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1936), the court, although not spcak-
ing directly to the problem, used language which would imply that the court assumcd
that "iincome" in section 162(b) meant all tax income whether or not also trust income:
Whatever terminology is used, the fact remains that in 1927 the trust receivcd from
the corporation $6,998,888.24, of which $1,432,939.28 was taxable income (capital
gains], andi that $1,185,088.24 thereof was currently distributable ....
84 F.2d at 762.
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capital gains, but that capital gains in any given year may be paid
to A or added to corpus in the trustee's discretion. During the
taxable year, the trust has a capital gain of $1,000 and the trustee
decides to pay it to A. Is the distribution to A deductible by the
trust and taxable to A under section 162(c) ?
For convenience that section is again quoted:
In the case of income received by estates of deceased persons during
the period of administration or settlement of the estate, and in the case
of income which, in the discretion of the fiduciary, may be either dis-
tributed to the beneficiary or accumulated, there shall be allowed as
an additional deduction in computing the net income of the estate or
trust, the amount of the income of the estate or trust for its taxable
year, which is properly paid or credited during such year to any
legatee, heir, or beneficiary, but the amount so allowed as a deduction
shall be included in computing the net income of the legatee, heir, or
beneficiary. (Emphasis added.)
Note at the outset that the phrase "properly paid or credited"
does not obviate a decision on the meaning of "income" in the
phrase "amount of income" in section 162(c), as did the phrase
"which is to be distributed currently" in section 162(b). To be
sure, if the capital gain is not paid or credited, "income" need not
be interpreted since no question of a section 162(c) deduction will
arise. If, however, as supposed, the capital gain is paid to A, the
fact that it is determined to have been properly paid does not mean
that it is " I trust income," making it therefore both "tax incomo"
and "trust income," and thus making irrelevant the interpretation
of "income" in section 162 (c). This is because, first, the capital gain
could have been properly paid, under the instrument, even though
it was not trust income, and second, the instrument specifically
provided that it was not to be considered trust income. Thus, to
allow a section 162(c) deduction in the above circumstances, would
require a holding that the word "income," in the italicized phrase
"amount of income" in the section, referred to amounts which
were tax income whether or not they were also trust income. Con-
versely, to disallow the deduction would seem to involve a holding
that "income" referred only to those amounts which were both
trust income and tax income.
The first case to confront the issue directly was Anna M.
Chambers.4 There a testamentary trust had total tax income for
1930 of $16,967.28, which included $9,913.85 of capital gains. Total
distributions to the beneficiaries in 1930 amounted to $21,000. The
14 33 B.T.A. 1125 (1936).
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Board determined that under the law of Pennsylvania the will
which created the trust required that the trust income be dis-
tributed currently, allowed the trustees to distribute corpus in their
discretion, and excluded the capital gains from trust income. The
conclusion of the Board was that the capital gains were taxable
to the trust and not deductible under section 162(c). The reasoning
of the Board began as follows:
We think the word "income" as used in section 162(e) includes gain
from the sale of corpus which is distributed as income but does not
apply when under the laws of the state it is a part of the corpus of the
estate and is not distributable as income.'s
This statement, of course, is merely another way of saying that
"income" in section 162(c) refers only to amounts which are both
trust income and tax income. What was the basis for such a con-
clusion? The Board continued:
This construction is, we think, further [sic] justified when we examine
the whole section, which must be considered in its relation to other
sections of the act in arriving at the content of the word "income."
It is provided in (e) that "the amount so allowed as a deduction shall
be included in computing the net income of the legatee, beir, or bene-
ficiary" but under section 22(b) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1928 a
legatee, heir, or beneficiary is not taxable on the corpus of an estate
which is distributed to him under the provisions of the will. Cf. Burnet
v. WMitehouse, 283 U.S. 148. He is, however, taxable upon amounts
paid to him as an ordinary beneficiary of income. Cf. Irvin v. Gavit,
268 U.S. 161; Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365. The fact that
under the revenue laws capital net gain is taxable income does not
prevent such gain from becoming a part of the corpus of the estate
immediately upon its realization nor change its character to income
-when distributed by the trustees under a power given them by the will
to distribute corpus. If, as here, such gain is in fact distributed by the
trustees under their discretionary power to distribute corpus, it is a
distribution of corpus to the heirs, legatees, or beneficiaries under the
will, and is not deductible by the fiduciary, ef. Helverhig v. Pardee,
290 U.S. 365.10
The Board's reasoning seems faulty on several grounds. In the
first place, although properly suggesting that a consideration of
the whole of section 162 and its relation to other sections of the
act might aid in interpreting "income" in section 162(c), the
Board did not follow its own admonition, which, it is submitted,
points to a conclusion opposite that of the Board. Note that in
S5 Id. at 1128.
'OId. at 1128-29 (emphasis added).
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section 162(c) the word "income" is used five times-three times
standing alone, and twice preceded by the word "net." In the first
two places where it is used alone, it is contained in phrases
descriptive of two of the four classes of income taxable to a trust or
estate under section 161, i.e., "income received by estates of de-
ceased persons during the period of administration or settlement of
the estate" and "in the case of income which in the discretion of
the fiduciary may be either distributed to the beneficiary or ac-
cumulated." These phrases of section 162(c) are identical with
those of section 161(a)(1) and section 161(a)(2) respectively.
Beyond question the word "income" in both instances refers to
all items of tax income and thus includes capital gains.1 In the two
places where "income" is used in the phrase "net income" the
reference is to the computation of the amount taxable to the trust
and the beneficiaries, and again obviously means tax income com-
prehending capital gains. There would thus seem to be no reason
for believing that when the word "income" is used for the third
time standing alone, in the phrase "amount of income of the estate
or trust for its taxable year" it refers to any other concept than
that referred to by the same word four other times in the same sub-
section.
Moreover, the purpose of section 162 and its role in the statutory
pattern for taxation of tax income argue strongly for an interpre-
tation of "income" as tax income. Congress intended to tax all
of the tax income of trusts, and to tax the "tax income "to those
benefited by it. If tax income is distributable to A or distributed
to A in the exercise of the trustee's discretion, A benefits by it.
If tax income is not distributable to A nor distributed to A, but
rather kept by the trust for later distribution to B, B benefits by it
and B, i.e., the trust which holds the tax income for B, should
pay the tax.
The Board, however, viewed section 22()) (3) of the Code,
exempting gifts, bequests and devises, as dictating a different re-
suit. The reasoning of the Board in this respect would seem to
amount to this: Section 22(b) exempts gifts and bequests of corpus
from the income tax. Capital gains, although tax income to the trust,
became part of the corpus immediately upon their receipt by the
trustee. Therefore, when capital gains were distributed by the
trustee under his discretionary power to distribute corpus, they
17 See I.R.C. § 22(a) (1939); Merehants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 265 U.S.
509 (1921).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23:TAX LAW REVIW
8TAXATION OP CAPITAL GAINS OP A TRUST
were distributed as corpus and thus within the exemption of section
22(b). The difficulty with this analysis, however, lies in its failure
to distinguish "trust income" from "tax income." Section 22(b)
(3) provided:
The following items shall not be included in gross income and shall
be exempt from taxation under this chapter:... the value of property
acquired by gift, bequest, or devise, or inheritance (but the income
from such property shall be included in gross income) ....
Thus, as the parenthetical phrase of section 22(b) (3) indicates,
the exemption, in a trust situation, does not apply to the tax in-
come of the trust, whether or not such tax income is considered
trust income as well. The exemption applies only to tax corpus, i.e.,
the value of the orginal property placed in trust. This orginal
corpus is subject, in a testamentary situation, to the federal estate
tax (to the gift tax in an inter vil'os situation), and as the Supreme
Court stated in Lyeth v. Hoey: 18 "Congress has not indicated any
intention to tax again the value of the property which legatees, de-
visees or heirs receive from the decedent's estate." "h But accre-
tions to the original corpus-by way of ordinary tax income or
capital gains-do not constitute the "value of property acquired by
gift, bequest or devise" but are "income from such property,"
i.e., tax income.
Thus, in the Chambers case, the capital gain was trust corpus
as opposed to trust income. It, nevertheless, was also tax income.
When distributed to the beneficiary it was still trust corpus and tax
income. The distribution by the trust as a conduit certainly could
not make the capital gain part of the original corpus, that is, it
could not change tax income into tax corpus. Indeed, if the capital
gain was within section 22(b) (3) there would seem to be no reason
why it was not exempt in the hands of the trustee, -who was a
legatee, as well as the beneficiary 20 If such were the case, however,
capital gains of a trust would escape taxation altogether--contrary
to section 161. The truth is, of course, that the gift and bequest
exemption of section 22(b) (3) was irrelevant to the section 162(e)
question in Chambers. Nevertheless, the Chambers rationale was
not only followed consistently by the Board itself 2 but was, in
is 305 U.S. 188 (1938).
L9 Id. at 195.
20 The fact that the trustee is not a beneflial legatee is not relevant. He pays no
income tax on amounts of principal received as gifts or bequests.
21 See, e.g., Ol Colony Trust Co., 38 B.T.A 828 (1938), involving capital gains dis-
tributed pro rata by the executors of an estate among various pecuniary legatees.
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essence, adopted by every court of appeals which thereafter con-
sidered the question.2
In summary, under the 1939 Code, prior to the 1942 amendments,
(1) under section 162(b) capital gains were deductible by the trust
22 Simon v. Hoey, 180 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 966 (1950); Bureliennl
v. Comm'r, 150 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1945); Estate of Rogers, 143 P.2d 695 (2d Or.),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 780 (1944); Weigel v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1938).
Contra, Weber v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1940) (dictum). This case was rejected
by Estate of Rogers, supra. Cf. Comm'r v. Stearns, 65 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1933).
The approach of the courts took a slightly different form from that of the Board in
Chambers. The courts emphasized the section 162 (e) phrase "properly paid or credited,"
holding that those terms:
must be taken to mean properly paid or credited as income. For if it is properly
paid or credited as a legacy or inheritance under a will it is exempt from income
tax as against the legatee or heir under section 22(b) (3) and cannot be included
in the computation of the net income of the legatee or heir under section 162 (c);
and the result -would be to transform the deduction authorized by section 162 (c) into
an exemption. This would defeat the obvious purpose of ,ection 162(e), which Is
merely to permit the shifting of the liability to account for estate incone from
executors or administrators to legatees or heirs to whom it has boon properly paid
or credited.
Weigel v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1938).
The essence of this approach is the same as that of Chambers, both being based on the
erroneous view that section 22(b) (3) exempted gifts of tax income if it was trust or
estate corpus.
In Weigel, Bogers and BurchenaZ, the capital gains were distributed by the executors
to the trustees of a testamentary trust. In Sinwn v. Hoey, on the other hand, the gains
were distributed by the executors to legatees, i.e., beneficial legatees. In the Weigcl case,
the Seventh Circuit had said, in dictum:
When no testamentary trust is involved it is consistent with the reality of the
situation to hold, for purposes of section 162(c) supra, that residuary logatcs who
receive payments of funds composed both of original assets of the estate and of
estate income, receive that portion represented by estate income as income derived
from their own property. This follows from the generally recognized rule that
the right of a residuary legatee to his distributive share of the personal property
of an estate vests at the death of the decedent. But in the case of the creation of a
testamentary trust out of the residue of an estate, the residue consisting of estate
corpus and estate income, the reality, both factually and legally, is that estate
income has ceased to have any identity. And it would seem to follow that fiduciaries
who take the residue as the res of a testamentary trust receive it as trust corpus
and not as a payment, in whole or in part, of estate income.
Weigel v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 387, 389 (7th Cir. 1938).
This distinction drawn in Weigel between distributions to beneficial legatees as opposed
to nonbeneficial legatees would lead to the allowance of the section 102(e) deduction
in a case like Simon v. Hoey. As indicated, however, Simon did not allow the deduction
and neither the district court nor the Second Circuit ever adverted to the Wreigel dictum.
In any event, it would seem that this dictum contradicts the rationale of WcigeZ itself.
For if, as the Weigel case held, the phrase "properly paid or credited" in section 102(c)
"must be taken to mean properly paid or credited as income" and if, as the court
further held, the capital gains became part of the corpus of the estate immediately upon
receipt, the gains could no more have been paid to beneficial legatees as income thni
they were to the trustees of the testamentary trust. If the distribution of the gain to
the trustees was a distribution of corpus and within the section 22(b) (3) exemption,
it could not be consistently held that an identical payment became a payment of income
because the recipients were beneficial legatees as opposed to trustees.
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or estate only if they were required by the will or trust "to be dis-
tributed currently"; (2) under section 162(c) capital gains were
not deductible by the fiduciary even where they were distributed,
unless they were distributed "as income," i.e., unless they were
distributed pursuant to the provisions of an instrument allowing
their distribution as distributions of income as that term was used
within the instrument, trust or will.
The 1942 Amendments
In 1942 Congress enacted several amendments to section 162 of
the 1939 Code. Although none of these amendments spoke specifi-
cally to the capital gains problem, certain of them were thought, and
in at least one case were held, to have affected the question. 'We
will first consider the amendment to section 162(b).
THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 162(b)
As amended in 1942, section 162(b) read, in pertinent part, as
follows (the italicized words indicate the new provisions):
There shall be allowed as an additional deduction in computing the
net income of the estate or trust the amount of the income of the estate
or trust for its taxable year which is to be distributed currently by the
fiduciary to the legatees, heirs, or beneficiaries, but the amount so
allowed as a deduction shall be included in computing the net income
of the legatees, heirs, or beneficiaries whether distributed to them or
not. As used in this subsection, "income which is to bc dislributed cur-
rently" includes income for the taxable year of tlhc estate or trust
which, within the taxable year, beconmes payable to the legatee, hcir,
or beneficiary.
The quoted amendatory provisions, in the words of the Senate
Finance Committee Report, were:
designed to include in the income of a legatee or beneficiary the income
of the estate or trust for its taxable year which, within such taxable
year, becomes payable to the legatee or beneficiary, even though it
then becomes payable as part of an accumulation of income held until
the happening of some event which occurs within the taxable year.
Such cases are usually cases where accumulated income of an estate is
paid to a residuary legatee upon termination of the estate or where
income of a trust is accumulated for distribution upon the beneficiary's
reaching a specified age.
The question of whether the income of an estate or trust for the
taxable year in which it becomes payable as part of an accumulation is
taxable on the one hand to the estate or trust or on the other hand to
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
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the legatee or beneficiary has been a source of litigation in certain cases
under existing law. This amendment is designed to clarify the law."a
Although the report speaks in terms of clarifying the law, it is
probably more accurate to view the amendment to section 162(b)
as changing the law. Prior to that amendment it had been uni-
formly held by several courts of appeals that where, for example,
a trustee, on a calendar year basis, was directed to accumulate
income until a beneficiary became 21 years old, and then pay the
accumulated income to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary becamo
21 on December 31, the current income of the trust for the year
of distribution was not, under section 162(b), deductible by the
trust and includable by the beneficiary.24 The reasoning of these
decisions was that the current income was not " I currently" distribu-
table within the meaning of section 162(b) because it was not
"periodically" distributable. Strong reliance was placed on the
four categories enumerated in section 161(a) which were hold
to be mutually exclusive so that one of the categories-income ac-
cumulated for future distribution-could not fall into the "cur-
rently distributable" category in the year payment was required.2-
23 S. REP. No. 1631, 77 Cong., 2d Sess. 71-72 (1942), reprinted at 1942-2 Cum. BULL.
504, 559-60.
24Comm'r v. Shelden, 134 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1943); Conim'r v. Clark, 134 F.2d
159 (2d Cir. 1943); Spreckels v. Comm'r, 101 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1939); Roobling v.
Comm'r, 78 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1935). Cf. Cowles v. United States, 50 F.Supp. 242 (Ct.
Cl. 1943), where the government evinced a total misunderstanding of the above deci-
sions, stating in its brief:
In view of these decisions [Joebling, Spreckles and Clark] we do not contend that
where income, which under the terms of the trust instrument is to be distributed in
the discretion of the fiduciaries, is accumulated and paid to the beneficiary as a
part of the corpus, it is taxable to the beiieficiary. (Emphasis added.) 50 1,F.Supp.
at 245.
The Court of Claims refused to accept this concession, properly pointing out that
the cases mentioned concerned section 162(b) and not section 162(c):
In each of the cases cited the income was required by the trust instrument to be
distributed on a date certain. In none of them was the income distributed under it
discretionary power lodged in the trustee by the trust instrument. The income in
the case at bar was distributed under a discretionary power and comes squarely
within the terms of section 162(c) .... 50 F.Supp. at 245.
(The report of the case, incidentally, does not indicate whether any capital gains were
involved in the distribution in issue.)
25 As was stated by the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Clark, 134 F.2d 159, 161 (2d
Cir. 1943):
The categories of trust income established by section 161(a) are based upon
the fiduciary's duties as prescribed by the terms of the trust. Income accumulated
for "future distribution" speaks with reference to the trustee's duty to retain
the income after its receipt and without regard to the taxable year. In contrast to
accumulated income subdivision (2) [of section 161(a)] speaks of income to be
"distributed currently," that is, presently or periodically as distinguished from
future. The two categories are mutually exclusive. Section 162(b) deals only with
the second category. The fact that accumulated income must in some taxable
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Whatever be the merits of these decisions, they implied noth-
ing with respect to the capital gains problem. The only question
involved was whether the phrase "to be distributed currently"
included the case where an amount became payable upon the benefi-
ciary's reaching a certain age.26 If, as the courts held, this ques-
tion was to be answered in the negative because the current income
was not periodically distributable, it was immaterial whether capi-
tal gains or ordinary tax income were involved since in either case
the amount was not within the section 162(b) deduction. Nor would
an affirmative answer have added anything to the capital gains
question under section 162(b). To be sure, if capital gains were in-
volved in the amount in question, as was the case in at least one of
the decisions,2 the court would have had to determine whether the
amount was "an amount of income" within section 162 (b), but, as
was stated previously, this would not involve the court il deter-
year be distributed to the beneficiary does not, in our opinion, cause it to change
over in that year to the second category of trust income. If payment nccording
to the terms of the trust were sufficient to bring the income within the reach of
section 162(b), regardless of the category within which it originally fell, there
would have been no need for the enactment of subdivision (c) [of section 162] re-
specting discretionary distributions. We cannot regard it as without signifcance
that Congress dealt &pressly with discretionary distributions and omitted to make
provision for taxing to the beneficiary accumulated income when paid to him.
The reference in Clark to section 162(e) is of questionable significance. The court's
statement that if section 162(b) allowec the deduction in the case before it, section
162(e) became superfluous, was inaccurate. The case before the court involved an amount
which the beneficiary, during the trust's taxable year, acquired the right to have dis-
tributed to him. Section 162(e) did not apply to such a situation, but rather to one
where the amount may be distributed or accumulated in the trustee's discretion. What
the court shou d have stressed was the fact that whereas section 161 divided income
of estates and trust into four categories ((a) income to be accumulatcd; (b) income
to be distributed currently; (e) income of estates during settlement or administration;
and (d) income which could be accumulated or distributed), section 162 allows deductions
only for three categories, omitting any reference to income to be accumulated. See
Comm'r v. Stearns, 65 F.2d 371, 373 (2d Cir. 1933).
On the other hand, it would be anomalous to hold that Congress meant that a bene-
ficiary was taxable if he could compel payment when he reached a certain age, but was
not taxable if he could not compel payment when. he reached a certain age, but was
nevertheless paid in the trustee's discretion.
26 It was earlier stated that the federal courts bad held that state law, i.e., the state
law's interpretation of the instrument in question, determined whether an amount was
currently distributable. Although this is the phraseology of the federal cases, it would
be more accurate to describe them as holding that state law determined whether and
when a particular amount was to be distributed, that is, how much a beneficiary could
compel a trustee to pay him and at what time. The cases under discussion did. not involve
these questions. They were concerned with the meaning of "currently" or the meaning
of the category described as "to be distributed currently." There was nothing in sec-
tion 161 or section 162 which "by express language or necessary implication" (Burnet v.
Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932)) made this question dependent on state law and the
question was properly so treated by the courts.
271oebling v. Comm'r, 78 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1935).
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mining whether "income" included capital gains even if they wero
not trust income under the instrument. For if the amount was to be
distributed it was because it came within the meaning of income as
used in the trust instrument which directed that income be accumu-
lated and then paid to the beneficiary on his reaching a certain
age. This, again, would make the amount both trust income and
tax income and obviate deciding whether "income" in section
162(b) referred only to items which were both tax income and trust
income.F8
By a parity of reasoning, the quoted amendment to section 162
(b) would not seem to have changed the situation as far as capital
gains were concerned; for all that the amendment did was to in-
clude within "income which is to be distributed currently" an
amount of "income for the taxable year of the estate or trust
which, within the taxable year, becomes payable to the legatee,
heir, or beneficiary." To illustrate this point, suppose a trust
created in 1943 provided for income to be accumulated and paid
to A on his 21st birthday, thereafter the income to be paid
annually to A, with the corpus to be transferred to B on A's death.
Suppose further that the trust was on a calendar year basis, that
A became 21 on December 31, 1944 and that the trust received dur-
ing 1944 ordinary dividends of $1,000 and capital gains of $1,000.
Ordinarily, under state law, the capital gains would not be con-
sidered within the phrase "income to be accumulated" as used in
the trust, although the ordinary dividends would. Thus the gains
would not become "payable" within the 1942 amendment to section
162(b) and the deduction would not be allowed, rendering un-
necessary, as before, a determination of whether the deduction was
also not allowable because inIcome" in the 1942 amendment meant
only items which were both tax income and trust income. Con-
versely, if the gains were "payable" it would be because the phrase
"income to be accumulated" included them, again rendering un-
necessary a construction of "income" within the 1942 amendment
since the gains would be both tax income and trust income.
2 Another purpose of the 1942 amendments to section 162(b) was to reverse the
result of a. number of decisions which had held that where income (ordinary or capital
gains) was distributed by an estate as part of a final distribution of an estate, the
income distributed was not taxable to the legatee, but was within the exemption of
section 22(b)(3). See, e.g., Anderson's Estate v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 46 (0th Cr. 1942);
Dunlop v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1948); Durkheimer v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A.
585 (1940). For the reasons stated in the text with respect to the cases involving trusts
wherein amounts became distributable to beneficiaries on a certain date, these dcisions
likewise implied nothing one way or the other with respect to the capital gains problem.
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Nor did the amendment to section 162(b) appear to affect the
decisions, discussed under the prior heading, which held that, under
section 162(c), discretionary distributions of capital gains were
not deductible to the trust and not taxable to the beneficiary since
they were received as tax-exempt gifts or legacies. Just such an
effect, however, was given to the amendment to section 162(b) in
Carlisle v. Commissiouer 2 9 where the estate made a discretionary
distribution of capital gains in the year prior to the final distribu-
tion of the estate. The beneficiary contended the amount was not
taxable to her, relying on the square authority of Burcheizal v.
Cominissioer,30 which had held on similar facts, under the un-
amended 1939 Code, that the distribution was received as a tax-
exempt legacy because it was not distributed as "Iincome." Faced
with the opportunity to reject the improper rationale of Burchenal
and hold that the distribution was taxable to the beneficiary under
section 162(c) as a discretionary distribution of income (and
tlhereby to interpret "income" as used in section 162(c) to mean
all items of tax income whether or not they also were items of trust
or estate income), the court instead held the capital gain distribu-
tion deductible to the trust and taxable to the beneficiary under the
1942 amendment to section 162(b). The word "payable," held the
court, must be interpreted to include "paid," so that any amount
of income actually paid is therefore payable and hence currently
distributable. Not to so hold, suggested the court, would create the
anomaly that a beneficiary would be taxable upon an amount pay-
able, whether or not received, but would not be taxable upon an
amount actually paid, but which was not payable because it was
-within the fiduciary's discretion to pay or not to pay."
Of course, the anomaly which the court wished to avoid in Car-
lisle had been created prior to the 1942 amendment by Burcheizal
and its brethren cases. As previously noted, capital gains which
were required to be distributed currently were taxable to the
beneficiary, but those distributed pursuant to a discretionary power
were not so taxable. In order properly to remove the anomaly, the
Carlisle court should have rejected the rationale of Burchenat as
to discretionary distributions of capital gains and held them tax-
able to the beneficiary under section 162(c). Instead this result was
reached, in effect, by holding that an exercise of discretion by the
29 165 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1948), affirming 8 T.C. 563 (1947).
so 150 P.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1945).
31 Carlise v. Comm'r, 165 F.2d 645, 648 (6th Cr. 1948).
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fiduciary to pay the capital gains made the gains "payable" within
section 162(b)2 The probable source of this interpretation was a
Treasury regulation, "3 which in turn most likely was drawn from
the Senate Finance Committee report accompanying the 1942
amendment to section 162(b).3 4
The problem, however, with this judicial interpretation, the ad-
ministrative regulation, and the legislative report was that they
rendered section 162(c) completely superfluous since they wiped
out any distinction between a discretionary distribution and a man-
datory distribution. If the fiduciary's exercise of discretion to pay
income rendered that income "payable" and thus currently dis-
tributable, to what could section 162(c) apply? What would be the
purpose of retaining section 162(c) in the Code? What would be
the purpose of retaining the section 161 distinction between in-
come which could be paid or accumulated and income which is
to be distributed currently? As one commentator has said:
Neither statements in Committee Reports nor regulations issued by
the Commissioner can deliberately ignore a specific provision in the
Code by creating definitions which, in effect, utterly destroy the mean-
ing of the provisionY5
The same commentator criticized Carlisle on another ground 38
The basis of the additional criticism was the contention that the
word "income" in the pre-1942 section 162(b) phrase "amount of
income" meant income as defined by local law, or what I have
32 Ibid.
33 Reg. 111, See. 29.162-2(b) (1943), which provided:
As used in section 162, the term Iincomo which becomes payable" means inconm
to which the legatee, heir, or beneficiary has a present right, whether or not stuch
income is actually paid. Such right may be derived from the directions in the trust
instrument or will to make distributions of income at a certain dato, or from thw
exercise of the flduciary's discretion to distribute income, or from a recognized
present right under the local law to obtain or compel a distribution of hicome.
(Emphasis added.)
34 S. REP. No. 1631, 77 Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1942), reprinted at 1942-2 CUM. BULL.
504, 560:
In the case of a similar trust [that is, a trust which directs the trustee to accumulate
the income until the beneficiary becomes 21 years old], whero the twenty-first
birthday of B, the beneficiary, was on July 1, 1942, and the income of the trust
was to be accumulated until that date and then to be distributed to B at such
time as the trustee in his discretion decides, if the trustee on December 31, 1942,
decides to distribute the accumulated income to B, the income becomes payable
to B on December 31, 1942, whether distributed to him or not.
35 KENNEDY, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION oP ESTATES AND TRUSTS § 2.07A, p. 110
(1948); see also, Mannheimer & Friedman, Income Tax Aspects of Yarious Will and
Trust Arrangements, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 909, 934 (1952).
36 Kennedy, Recent Developments in the Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 27 TAxES
1118, 1120 (1949).
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been calling, with respect to trusts, trust income. I have attempted
to show previously, however, not only that there was never a square
holding to this effect, because the issue did not have to be faced, but
also that such an interpretation would be contrary to the congres-
sional design to tax the tax income to the person whom the income
benefited.
In the Carlisle case, the meaning of "income" in section 162(b)
had to be faced, but only because the court, through what has been
suggested was an erroneous interpretation of the 1942 amendment,
held that a discretionary payment of capital gains made such gains
"payable" and thus "currently distributable." The court did
not discuss whether "income" included capital gains or whether
it referred only to income under local law (the will was silent
as to disposition of any additions to the estate during administra-
tion), but by its holding it effectuated an authoritative precedent
that "income" meant tax income even though such was not income
under local law.
Carlisle, it is suggested, came up with the right results but for
all the wrong reasons. It applied an inapplicable provision and
interpreted it incorrectly except in one instance, and there without
discussion. It correctly held, however, that capital gains distributed
under a discretionary power to distribute or retain were deductible
to the estate and includable by the legatee.7
THE ADDITION OF SECTION 162(d)
In addition to the section 162(b) amendment, consideration must
be given to another of the 1942 changes in section 162, namely
the addition of section 162(d).
That new subsection read, in pertinent part:
For the purposes of subsection (b) and (c)-
(1) .... In cases where the amount paid, credited, or to be distributed
can be paid, credited, or distributed out of other than income, the
amount paid, credited, or to be distributed (except under a gift, be-
quest, devise or inheritance not to be paid, credited, or distributed at
intervals) during the taxable year of the estate or trust shall be con-
sidered as income of the estate or trust which is paid, credited, or to
be distributed if the aggregate of such amounts so paid, credited, or to
be distributed does not exceed the distributable income of the estate
or trust for its taxable year.
The phrase "distributable income" was defined, in effect, as the
greater of (a) the net tax income or (b) the net trust income.
37 As it should have been held before the 1942 amendment sinco the amendment to
section 162 (b) added nothing.
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It is very difficult to determine the effect of this amendment on
the capital gains question. 3s On the one hand, it speaks to cases
"where the amount paid" not where "the amount of income paid"
(emphasis added). It thus avoids the difficulty of section 162(c)
and seemingly comprehends any payment, capital gains or not.
Moreover, "distributable income," the measuring rod of the maxi-
mum deductibility to the trust and taxability to the beneficiary in-
cludes, in its computation, capital gains, since these are part of
tax income.
On the other hand, the section applies where "the amount paid
... can be paid 8 ... out of other than income" and it could be
argued that the section refers only to amounts paid out of the
original corpus which thus would not include capital gains which
are considered accretions to the original corpus. It would seem,
however, that "out of other than income" was intended to be
broader than just the equivalent of original corpus and to include
all sources other than what was local law or trust (or estate) in-
come for the year in question. It would appear, for example, def-
initely to include payments out of amounts of trust income of
prior years which had been accumulated and added to corpus.
There is thus no reason why it would not also apply to payments
out of accumulated or current nontrust income, i.e., capital gains.
Finally, however, the section, by its express terms, did not apply
where the payment was made "under a gift, bequest, devise or in-
heritance not to be paid... at intervals." (Emphasis added.) In
Carlisle, section 162(d) was interpreted as not applicable to
the distribution of capital gains there made by the estate to the
legatee because the distribution was not one "to be paid at inter-
vals." This exception would also, as the Carlisle court indicated,
prevent the inclusion, within section 162 (d), of discretionary distri-
butions of capital gains by a trustee to a beneficiary and would
thus not affect the holdings in Burchenal and like cases. 40
Suppose, however, as in the case of an annuity, that the amount
was to be paid at intervals. Assume the following: A trust provides
that A and B are to be paid $5,000 a year, that these payments are
38 As Kennedy noted, section 162(d) is "about as distressing to the -understanding
as any [provision] ever sponsored by such a presumably august body as the Congross
of the United States." KENNEDY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OP ESTATES AND TRUSTs
§ 2.12, p. 160 (1948).
39 The phrase "can be paid" would seem to include "must be paid." See Bog. 111,
Sec. 29.162-2(a) (1943).
40Actually, the Carlisle court spoke of the 1942 amendment to section 22(b)(3).
This, however, was merely the counterpart of section 162(d)-or vice-versa.
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to be made from trust income to the extent such is sufficient, that
if trust income is not sufficient, the annuities are to be paid out of
corpus, and that capital gains are to be considered trust income
and not corpus. In the year in question, the trust has ordinary in-
come of $5,000 and a capital gain of $10,000. The trustee keeps
separate accounts and pays $5,000 from the ordinary income to
A and $5,000 from the capital gain to B. Would B be taxable on
the $5,000 paid to him under section 162(d) (1) ? It would seem so.
The amounts paid to A and B would not exceed distributable in-
come which includes, in its computation, the capital gain of $10,000;
they are amounts paid "out of other than income," i.e., trust in-
come; and they are amounts which are to be paid at intervals 1
In light of the above, the case of Estate of Wadewitz 42 is some-
what of a mystery. There certain stock was placed in trust and
the trustees were directed to pay to taxpayer $1,000 per month
from the principal and income. In addition, the trustees were given
complete discretion to determine how all receipts and disburse-
ments of the trust were to be credited, charged, or apportioned
between principal and income. During 1949, 1950 and 1951 the
trustees received ordinary dividends and also realized capital
gains. During these years the total sum of the ordinary dividends
and capital gains was insufficient to provide for the monthly dis-
tributions to taxpayer and other beneficiaries of the trust. In fact
fno distributions were actually made. The trustees reported both
the ordinary dividends and the capital gains; the beneficiaries re-
ported neither.
Before the Tax Court, taxpayer conceded that the ordinary divi-
dends were taxable to herself and the other beneficiaries, but con-
tended that the capital gains were taxable to the trust.
The situation seems squarely within the language and purpose
of section 162(d). The amount to be distributed to taxpayer
($12,000 a year) included some amount which could (had to) be
paid out of other than trust income, i.e., an amount which had to be
paid out of original trust corpus or the accretions to trust corpus
4, See Note, Tazation of Capital Gains Realiei by Trusts, 12 TAx L. Rhv. 99, 101
(1956) (speaking of "the type of annuity trust where the beneficiary is to receivo a
fixed amount each year out of corpus to the extent that income is insufficient"):
Under the 1939 Code, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942, the result was
generally that the beneficiary was taxed on capital gains to the extent of the
corpus invasion, because he was taxed on the statutory net income, or the trust
income, whichever was greater, to the extent actually distributed1 to him.
The author, however, cites no cases or rulings. Of. Estate of Wadewitz, 32 T.C. 538
(1959), discussed in the text accompanying note 42, infra.
42 32 T.C. 538 (1959).
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including capital gains. Such included amount was payable at in-
tervals.
The Tax Court, however, did not even mention section 162(d)
but held, in agreement with the government's contention, that the
capital gains were taxable to taxpayer since they were currently
distributable within section 162(b). The taxpayer had argued that
section 162(b) was inapplicable since the trustees, as authorized,
had allocated the capital gains to corpus and therefore, they were
not "income which is to be distributed currently." The court noted
the lack of evidence that such allocation had in fact been made, but
went on to say that even assuming such allocation:
[Taxpayer's] proportionate shares would, in the circumstances of the
instant case, be currently, distributable to her. This is so, because she
was entitled to $1,000 per month for life, to be paid out of Vrincipal
and income of the trust.... [T] he trust's ordinary income for each of
the taxable years fell far short of an amount sufficient to make distri-
butions to the beneficiaries of the amounts provided in the trust in-
denture. As a result, each of such beneficiaries . . . could have de-
manded that the trustees distribute sufficient principal (which, under
the hypothesis here assumed, included the capital gains here involved)
to make up the difference .... 43
Thus the Tax Court was saying that capital gains were "income"
within section 162(b) which could have been demanded by tax-
payer, and hence were currently distributable income.
The weakness in the above analysis, it is submitted, is found
in the parenthetical material of the last sentence of the quoted ex-
cerpt from the court's opinion. Section 162(b) taxes currently
distributable income to the beneficiaries whether distributed or
not because they can demand such income be distributed to them.
In a conventional trust, e.g., "income to A for life," A can demand
the income from the trust be distributed to him. Usually, however,
as noted, capital gains would not be considered trust income and
thus not subject to A's demand, i.e., not distributable.
An annuity is somewhat different. Where a trustee is to pay
A $1,000, out of income first, and out of principal only if income
is insufficient, it could be said that A can demand $1,000 of income
thus making $1,000 currently distributable within section 162(b).
But when, as in Wadewitz, the trust directs that the annuity be
paid out of income and principal, there is no apparent reason why
the beneficiary's right must first be applied to tax income, i.e.,
ordinary dividends and capital gain. Since the trust instrument
43 Id. at 544 (empbasis by the court).
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does not speak to the point, the annuity may well be considered a
charge on the whole fund and the beneficiary may have only the
right to demand payment ratably from all trust assets, including
original corpus. He would not have the right, as the Tax Court as-
sumed in Wadewitz, to demand that the specific profits from the
capital gains be given to him in payment of that part of the annuity
which had to come out of principal. Indeed, the annuitant would
have no concern with the source of the payment, and the assumption
that a demand for capital gains would have been made is unreal-
istic. The court's response to taxpayer's argument should have been
that under section 162(d) he could not avoid being taxed on the
payment. For it was just this problem for which section 162(d)
was enacted, i.e., to tax to an annuitant payments which under
the trust could, or had to, be made from trust corpus as opposed to
trust income, to the extent that the trust in the year in question,
had tax income available for distribution to the beneficiary.
In summary, it should have been clear that the 1942 amendments
effected little change in the capital gains area. The Carlisle case
to the contrary notwithstanding, the amendment to section 162(b)
was irrelevant to any strictly capital gain question, and the addi-
tion of section 162(d) was comparatively insignificant since it ap-
plied only where the distributions of the trust were to be made
"at intervals." The solution to the more important question, in-
volving discretionary distributions in taxable years during which
capital gains were realized, still depended on a proper interpreta-
tion of section 162(e) which had not been amended in 1942.
There is no doubt, however, that the Carlisle case and the early
decisions under section 162(e) had created practical confusion. In
an article written in 1949, it was pointed out that:
As a matter of actual practice, corporate fiduciaries in Chicago have
adopted conflicting positions, some treating capital gains... as taxable
to the trust and some treating them as taxable to the beneficiary; and
neither position has as yet been challenged upon audit of the returns. 4
Proposals of the American Law Institute
Before examining the 1951 Code sections, it would be beneficial
to consider the approach taken by the American Law Institute in
its proposed federal income tax statute.Y
Stated simply, but accurately for our purposes, the draft made
44 Kennedy, Recent Developnents in the Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 27 TAxs
1118, 1121 (1949).
45 ALI, FED. INCo0X TAX STAT. (Feb. 1954 Draft) (hereinafter aitea as ALI DnMAY).
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deductible by the trust and taxable to the beneficiary any amount
distributable or distributed to the beneficiary up to the "distributa-
ble net income" of tie trust. It further provided, in pertinent part,
as follows:
SECTION X806. DEFINITIONS.
(a) DISTRIBUTABLE NET INCOME.-
"Distributable net income" means the net income of a trust for its
taxable year, computed with the following modifications:
(1) Capital Gains and Losses.-
(A) Capital Gains.-The amount of any capital gain shall not be
included unless the amount is utilized in the determination of the
amount available to an income beneficiary.4
The draft comments to this provision stated:
Subsection (a). Distributable Net Income.
A. Existing Provisions
The comparable provisions are the last portion of section 162(d) (1)
B. Suggested Provisions
1. The total distributable net income determines the uppermost
limit on amounts taxable to beneficiaries and deductible by the trust....
2 .....
3. Paragraph (1) (A) in general excludes from distributable net in-
come items which are not "income" under state law. The effect of
the provision varies. Suppose that there are distributions of $1,000 and
that there is ordinary income of $500 and capital gain of $500. Assume
that the capital gain is not income under local law. If paragraph
(1) (A) were omitted, the beneficiaries would have to pay tax on the
$500 of capital gain as well as on the $500 of ordinary income. If this
provision applies, the beneficiaries will pay only on the ordinary in-
come while the trust will pay on the capital gain. But suppose the dis-
tributions remain at $1,000 and that there is ordinary income of $1,000
and capital gain of $1,000. Then the beneficiaries will have to bear a
tax on $1,000 of ordinary income, while the capital gain is taxed to the
trust. If this paragraph were omitted, the beneficiaries' tax would liavo
been on $500 of ordinary income and $500 of capital gain.
For a capital gain item to be excluded from distributable net income
under paragraph (1) (A) it must not be treated as income in the par-
ticular trust. Thus if the trust instrument provides or the trustee in the
40ALI DRAFT 124. For the purposes of section X800(a) the draft deflned income
"when not preceded by the words 'net' or 'gross' [as having reference to] . . . income
under the local law applicable to the determination of the amount available for distr.
bution to an income beneficiary, rather than to gross income or not income under this
Code."
"Income Beneficiary" was defined as "a beneficiary the distribution to whom do.
pends upon the amount which is treated as income under the local law applicable to
determining distributions." Id. at 125.
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exercise of his discretion determines that capital gains or taxable stock
dividends are to be treated as income, they enter distributable net in-
come even if not ordinarily deemed income under governing law.47
The difficulty with the draft provision was that it made the in-
clusion of capital gains in distributable net income turn on whether
such gains were treated as income under local law, i.e., under the
trust instrument as interpreted under local law. Thus capital gains
would be included where, e.g., the trust directed that they be con-
sidered income or the trustee in the exercise of a discretion granted
by the trust allocated them to trust income, and
(1) a beneficiary had the right to income under the trust, or
(2) the trustee had discretion to, and did, distribute income.
Suppose, however, that a trust was established under which the
income was to be paid to A for life, remainder to B; the trust pro-
vided that capital gains were to be considered corpus, and not
income, but also provided that the proceeds of capital gains might
(or had to) be distributed to A. Since the capital gains were not
treated as income under the trust, they would, under the draft
provision, not be included in distributable net income and thus
would be taxed to the trust, i.e., in effect, to the remaindemnan, even
though distributed to A. Yet there is no difference in substance be-
tween this trust and a trust which specifically calls capital gains
income. The purpose of the draft provision was, presumably, to tax
capital gains to a beneficiary who was benefited by such gains. The
provision would not fully accomplish its purpose, since a beneficiary
could benefit from capital gains even though the trust did not
consider them income.
The 1954 Code Provisions
The 1954: Code followed the ALI draft in rendering deductible
by the trust and taxable to the beneficiaries amounts distributed or
47 ALI D 424-25. Note that with respect to the first example cited in comment
B.3., it is stated that absent the suggested paragraph (1) (A) of section 800(a) "Itho
beneficiaries would have to pay tax on the $500 of capital gain as well as on the $500
of ordinary income." It is unclear whether this is intenaca as a statement of what
the xesult would be under prior law, or what it would be if draft seetion 800(a) were
accepted without the inclusion of paragraph (1)(A). If the latter is meant, the
statement is correct. If the former is intended, however, the statement implies a mis-
conception of prior law, since, as was stated previously, and as was recognized by the
Sixth Circuit in Carlisle, (see text accompanying note 40, supra), section 162(d)(1)
did not apply to corpus distributions, i.e., distributions "out of other than income"
unless the distributions were payable "at intervals." In the situation described in the
comment, therefore, the $500 capital gain would not be taxable to beneficiaries merely
because there were distributions of $1,000.
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distributable to the beneficiaries up to the "distributable net in-
come" of the trust. The definition of distributable net income is
found in section 643 (a) which provides, in pertinent part, as fol-
lows:
For purposes of this part, the term "distributable net income"
means, with respect to any taxable year, the taxable income of the
estate or trust computed with the following modifications-
(2) ....
(3) .... Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets shall be
excluded to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are
not (A) paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any beneficiary
during the taxable year ....
Insofar as this section includes in distributable net income capital
gains which are allocated to income under the trust, it is in agree-
ment with the ALI draft. Thus, capital gains would be included if
the trust directs that they be included in "income" or if the trustee
has discretion under the trust to allocate capital gains to income or
corpus and allocates the gains in question to income. The Code re-
jects, however, the draft approach of excluding capital gains merely
because they are allocated to corpus. Under section 643(a) (3),
capital gains, even if allocated to corpus, are included in distributa-
ble net income if they are "paid, credited, or required to be dis-
tributed" to a beneficiary.
The applicability of this latter portion of section 643(a) (3) will
in some situations be fairly clear. If, for example, the trust states
that capital gains, although allocable to corpus and thus not dis-
tributable to the beneficiary entitled to the income, are to be dis-
tributed to another beneficiary, they would be included in dis-
tributable net income.
Or suppose the following (hereafter referred to as hypothetical
A): A trust provides that the income is to be paid to A for life,
remainder to B; that income does not include capital gains; that
the trustee is to keep separate accounts for (1) original corpus
plus prior undistributed capital gains, (2) current ordinary income,
and (3) current capital gains; and that the trustee may in his dis-
cretion make a distribution to A or B out of the current capital
gains account, but not out of the account kept for original corpus
and prior capital gains.
In the taxable year, the trust has a capital gain of $1,000, and
the trustee distributes $1,000 to A out of the current capital gains
account. In such a case it would seem clear that the $1,000 capital
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gain has been "paid" to A within section 643(a)(3) and thus
would be included in distributable net income.
But suppose we vary hypothetical A by assuming that the trustee
was prohibited from making any distribution out of the current
capital gains account, but was given discretion to make distribu-
tions from the account kept for original corpus and prior undis-
tributed capital gains. In the taxable year, the trust has a capital
gain of $1,000. The trustee distributes $1,000 to A from the account
kept for original corpus and prior undistributed capital gains.
Does the gain enter into distributable net income? One would sup-
pose not, since the gain was not paid. Indeed, the instrument
prohibited the gain from being paid. But is there a real difference
between this situation and the previous one? Consider some addi-
tional variations on the above theme:
(a) The trust provides that its income is to be distributed; that
capital gains are not income but corpus, and that corpus may be
invaded and paid to A. The trust is silent as to the maintenance of
separate accounts and as to the source of any corpus invasion and pay-
ment. In the taxable year, the trust has a capital gain of $1,000.(1) The trustee does not keep separate accounts and invades
corpus to the extent of $1,000 -which is paid to A. The invasion of
corpus and payment is before the capital gain is realized.(2) Same as (1) but the gain is realized before the invasion and
payment of corpus to A.(b) Same as (a) (2), but the trust provides tlat corpus may be
invaded only in a taxable year when a capital gain is realized.(c) Same as (b), but the trust requires that separate accounts be
kept for original and accumulated corpus, ordinary income, and
capital gains and that the corpus invasion and payment be only out of
original or accumulated corpus.
In all of these situations the trust has had a capital gain in the
amount of $1,000 and has made a corpus distribution of $1,000. In
this respect, they are the same as hypothetical A. However, they
all differ from hypothetical A in that in none of them can the
corpus invasion and payment be specifically traced to the current
capital gains.4" Does the difference suffice to exclude the gains from
distributable net income? Or, stated otherwise, are capital gains
which are allocated to corpus under the trust included in dis-
tributable net income only if a given corpus distribution 4 can be
48 Note that even in hypothetical A, it may not be possible to say that the identical
proceeds of the capital gain have been distributed, unless the eaish or other hinds of
proceeds are segregated and specifically paid. Presumably, however, payment from a
current capital gains account would render the gains paid within section G43(a)(3).
49 Note that when we speak of a corpus distribution here, wo refer only to partial
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traced to a current capital gains account? This was the position
taken by Kamin, Surrey and W arren: °
Whether... a [capital] gain is included in distributable net income
depends on whether or not it has been "paid." This test seems to be
analogous to the "traeing" tests which were embodied in the 1939
Code. For example, the pre-sixty-day rule applied only to distributions
of income of the preceding years; if there was also income of the cur-
rent year, the distribution had to be traced to determine which income
had been distributed. Similarly whether the current income, as opposed
to corpus or accumulated income, had been paid within the meaning of
Section 162(c) also involved tracing. While these particular tracing
rules have ceased to be applicable, tracing will be necessary to deter-
mine whether or not a capital gain has been distributed. 1
On the other hand, it has been argued by Theodore Berger that
reading a tracing requirement into section 643 (a) (3) would be:
clearly contrary to the expressed general intent of the draftsmen of
the 1954 Code. It was certainly their desire to get away from the
tracing rules which had so complicated prior law ....
In so far as taxable income becomes the starting point for
determining the taxability of distributions, the 1954 Code more nearly
resembles prior law on the subject. [Berger's reference here is to sec-
tion 162(d) (1) of the 1939 Code, as amended in 1942.] Therefore it
is at least arguable that prior law should apply and that the first
distributions out of corpus in any year should be considered to be
capital gains of that year.52
Berger, however, would seem to be inaccurate in implying that
section 162(d) (1) rendered taxable to the beneficiary distributions
of capital gains in the typical discretionary distribution case where
the distributions are not to be paid at intervals. Moreover, even in
the at intervals, i.e., annuity, type of trust, although, as indicated
earlier, Berger's implicit interpretation of section 162(d)(1)
would seem proper, the Wadewitz case casts doubt on whether that
interpretation was the accepted one.
distributions. If there has been a totl corpus distribution, as in the year of termination
or a partial distribution in an amount equal to more than the corpus less the capital
gains for the current years, there will, of necessity, have been a distribution of all
or part of the capital gains of the current year.
Go Kamin, Surrey & Warren, The Internal Revenue Code Of 1954: Trusts, Estates and
Beneficiaries, 54 CoLuir. L. REV. 1237, 1242 (1954).
5'As the authors note, tracing involves a grant to the trustee to dictate tax conse-
quences (unless the trust itself specifies the source of the corpus distribution). Something
more than a mental note is required of the trustee. See Wilma Aaron, 22 T.C, 1370
(1954); Elizabeth T. Jones, 1 T.C. 491 (1943).
52 Note, Taxation of Capital Gains Realized by Trusts, 12 TAX L. REV. 99, 101-02
(1956).
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In any event, Berger finally concludes that:
the policy against tracing distributions was strong enough in the minds
of the draftsmen to cause the rejection by them of any of these artifices
for determining -whether an otherwise unidentified payment out of
corpus includes a portion of realized capital gains. It is submitted that
the intent of the draftsmen of section 643 (a) was to tax a beneficiary
on capital gains allocated to corpus only in the relatively rare cases
where the governing instrument specifi~ally requires distribution
of the proceeds or the facts clearly reveal an intent to make available
to the beneficiary the proceeds of a sale or exchange as such.5
The legislative history, however, does not really support Berger's
position. The author's reference presumably is to the following
statements in the committee reports:
This approach represents a basic departure from the general rule
of the existing law that taxable distributions must be traced to the
income of the estate or trust for the current year.
The approach adopted by the bill eliminates the necessity, in deter-
mining the taxability of distributions, of tracing such distributions to
the income of the estate or trust for the current taxable year. The
simplicity of this general principle makes it possible to eliminate the
so-called 65-day and the 12-month rules of existing law. Under the bill,
except to the limited extent provided under the throwback rule (dis-
cussed later) which is designed to eliminate a loophole of existing law,
amounts distributed in 1 year will not be considered to have been
distributed in a preceding year, and the source of a distribution,
whether made from the income of the current year or of a preceding
year, is immaterial in determining the taxability of the distribution
in the hands of the beneficiary. Furthermore, amounts not included
in the gross income of the estate or trust will generally not be
taxable to the beneficiaries."4
Note, that the tracing problem sought to be avoided here was
with respect to determining whether a distribution was out of
current income as opposed to accumulated income, not with respect
to determining whether the distribution was out of current ordinary
53Id. at 102. Berger also suggests that a "Cmore equitable solution would be to con-
sider as capital gains distributions in the case of invasions of corpus that proportion
which the capital gains added to the corpus that year bear to the corpus available for
distribution." As Berger recognizes, this approach -would present many "administrative
difficulties" and "subsidiary problems." In addition, it Yould seem beyond serious
argument that this approach has no sanction in the statute. But of. AlA, FED. Dmco
ESTATE Am G=rt TAX STAT. 103 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1950).
-h.R. RFP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4086-87 (1954). A similar statement is contained in S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODr Cboo. & AD. Nws
4715 (1954).
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income as opposed to current capital gains. As the reports later
stated, in detailed discussion of the bill:
Instead of determining whether a particular distribution represents
amounts of current or accumulated trust income, this revision, broadly
speaking, provides that any distribution is considered a distribution
of the trust or estate's current income to the extent of its taxable
income for the year. 55
Indeed, as will be seen from what follows, the 1954 Code appears
to have created, with respect to the tier system, a requirement
(not present under prior law) of tracing a distribution to current
ordinary income as opposed to current capital gains. First, as has
already been suggested elsewhere, 0 the last sentence of section
662(a) (1) requires tracing to determine whether a distribution
which could be paid out of income or corpus was paid out of "in-
come for such taxable year" as opposed to corpus. If, for example,
an annuity is paid out of original corpus, or out of accumulated in-
come, it is not a first tier distribution within that section. To the
extent that such a distribution has to be traced to its chronological
source, section 662(a) (1) constitutes a retention of a similar tracing
requirement under prior law.
Additionally, and more important to our present discussion, sec-
tion 662 (a) (1) contains an additional nonchronological tracing
requirement not present under prior law. This is because the word
"income" in section 662(a) (1) is defined by section 643(b) as local
law income which does not ordinarily include capital gains. It is
thus not sufficient to trace the distribution to current tax income.
There is a further requirement that the distribution be traced to
current trust income, that is, for example, to ordinary income and
not capital gains.
Summarizing, then, Berger's argument would seem unsound
because:
(1) the tracing Congress sought to avoid was different from the
tracing argued by Kamin, Surrey and Warren to be involved in
section 643(a) (3) respecting capital gains;
(2) Congress not only did not totally eliminate the tracing gen-
erally inveighed against; but
55 .R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A199 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE
CoNe. & AD. NEws 4339 (1954) (emphasis added). A similar statement is contained in
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 349 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE CONe. &
AD. NEws 4990 (1954).
56 Del Cotto & Joyce, Taxation of the Trust Annuity: The Unilrust Under the Constitu.
tion and the Internal Revenue Code, 23 TAx L. REv. 257, 275-82 (1968).
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(3) also created in another section, section 662(a) (1), the same
kind of tracing requirement arguably involved in section 643(a).
The Approach of the Treasury Under the 1954 Code Provisions
The approach of the Treasury is set forth in section 1.643(a)-3
of the regulations, pertinent parts of which state:
(a) Gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets are ordi-
narily excluded from distributable net income, and are not ordinarily
considered as paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any
beneficiary unless they are:
(1) Allocated to income under the terms of the governing instru-
ment or local law....
(2) Allocated to corpus and actually distributed to beneficiaries
during the taxable year, or
(3) Utilized (pursuant to the terms of the governing instrument
or the practice followed by the fiduciary) in determining the amount
which is distributed or required to be distributed.
Note, at the outset, that this regulation does not adopt a general
approach that where there is capital gain for the taxable year any
corpus distribution includes, or is presumed to include, part or all
of the capital gains.
Paragraph (a) (2) is really no more than a restatement of the
statute with the apparently insignificant substitution of the phrase
"actually distributed" for the words "paid" or "credited." Pre-
sumably this paragraph would cover situations where the distribu-
tion (1) necessarily included the gain either by force of the govern-
ing instrument or because all of the corpus was distributed, or (2)
could be traced to the current capital gain account of the trustee.
The sig-nificant part of the regulation is paragraph (a) (3). The
importance of this paragraph lies in its necessary implication that
even where the distribution does not necessarily include the gain,
the gain is included in distributable net income if it was utilized
in determining the amount distributed. Indeed, under this part of
the regulation even if the instrument required a noneapital-gain
source for the distribution or the trustee, although not required to
do so, used a noncapital-gain source, the distribution would be
deemed to include the capital gain to the extent that it was utilized
to determine the amount distributed.
This approach, of course, directly rejects the suggestion earlier
discussed that where the distribution does not necessarily include
the gain, it must be traced. To that extent the regulation supports
the position of Berger. It goes further than his approach, however,
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since it does not restrict the interpretation of the word "paid"
(aside from where the gains are necessarily paid as part of a total
corpus distribution), to "the relatively rare cases where the gov-
erning instrument specifically requires distribution of the proceeds
or the facts clearly reveal an intent to make available to the bene-
ficiary the proceeds of a sale or exchange as such." 57
The source of paragraph (a) (3) of the regulation would seem to
be the following statement from the committee reports:
The bill adopts the general principle that to the extent of the
trust's current income all distributions are deductible by the estate
or trust and taxable to the beneficiaries ...
This approach, however, requires the use of a measure to impose
an outside limit on the total distributions deductible by the estate
or trust and taxable to the beneficiary. In general, the measure
adopted by the bill for this purpose is taxable income, computed
without regard to capital gains and losses unless these gains and
losses are utilized in determining the income available for distribu-
tionl18
The scope of paragraph (a) (3) of the regulation is somewhat
uncertain. First, when would a gain be "utilized... pursuant to the
terms of the instrument in determining the amount" of the
distribution? Although the regulation contains no examples spe-
cifically referable to this provision, the language would certainly
seem to cover a situation where the trust provided that corpus
could be distributed only during a year when there was a capital
gain, or where the trust directed the trustee to pay no more than
the amount of the gain, or similar situations where the trust re-
quires the trustee to consider the gain in determining whether or
how much to distribute. But suppose the instrument merely pro-
57 Note, Taxation of CapitaZ Gains Realized by Trusts, 12 TAx L. REV. 99, 102
(1956).
8 sH.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 4086-87 (1954) (emphasis added); see also S. Im,. No. 1622, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1954), reprinted at 3 U.S. CODP CoNG. & AD. N.ws 4714-15 (1954).
Note that the language of the regulation and the committee reports is almost idontical
with the ALI draft provision except that the regulation and the reports apply the utiliza.
tion principle to all distributions and not merely to "income beneficiaries." It is interest-
ing to note that in its 1956 tentative draft the ALI suggested that section 643 be revised
as follows:
(3) CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES-Gains from the sale or exchange of
capital assets shall, except in the year of termination of the estate or trust, be ex-
cluded to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and are not (A) utiliced
in the determination of the amount of income paid, credited, or required, to be
distributed to any beneficiary during the taxable year, or (B) paid, permanently
set aside, or to be used for the purposes specified in § 642(c) .... ALI FE.
IxcomE, ESTATE AND Gmi' TAX STAT. (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956).
Nothing in the ALI report, however, makes mention of the language of the regulation
or the committee reports.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
[Vol. 23 :TAX LAW REVIEW
TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS OF A TRUST
vides that the trustee many consider the gain in maldng his determi-
nation? Will the issue then turn on the mental processes of the
trustee? If so, what will constitute "utilizing"? Will the trustee be
heard to say that the gain was not the sole motive for the amount
of distribution or that the gain was of very little importance?
This same kind of problem is presented by the rest of this para-
graph, i.e., the phrase "utilized... pursuant to... the practice of
the fiduciary .... " Presumably, the -word "practice" connotes
some continuity so that if the instrument were silent as to the con-
sideration of the gains, the consideration of the gain by the trustee
in any given year would not of itself require the inclusion of the
gain in distributable net income for that year. But even assuming,
for example, that if the trustee considered the gains, say three
years consecutively, consideration in the fourth year would amount
to consideration as a practice, there would still be the problem of
what kind of consideration amounts to "utilizing."
The problem is compounded by an implication contained in one
of the examples in the regulation. The example states:
A trust is created to pay the income to A for life, with a discre-
tionary power in the trustee to invade principal for A's benefit. In
the taxable year, $10,000 is realized from the sale of securities at a
profit, and $10,000 in excess of income is distributed to A. The
capital gain is not allocated to A by the trustee. During the taxable
year the trustee received and paid out $5,000 of dividends. No other
cash was received or on hand during the taxable year. The capital
gain will not ordinarily be included in the distributable net income.
However, if the trustee follows a regular practice of distributing
the exact net proceeds of the sale of trust property, capital gains
will be included in distributable net incomeri
It is difficult indeed to determine the basis for the statement in
the above example that "The capital gain will not ordinarily be
included in distributable net income." Given that no other cash
was received or on hand during the taxable year, so that the $10,000
in excess of income distributed to A constituted the proceeds of the
capital gain transaction, on what theory could it be said that the
gain has not been paid to A within section 643(a) (3)? On what
theory could it be said that the gain was not in the words of para-
graph (a) (2) of the regulation 'Allocated to corpus and actually
distributed to beneficiaries during the taxable year"?
Secondly, if in the cited example the gains have not been paid
within section 643 (a) (3), how could a regular practice render them
19fleg. Sec. 1.643(a)-3(d) Ex. (1) (1956).
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paid? If the trustee does the same thing the next year, are they
still not paid? Furthermore, what is meant by "exact net pro-
ceeds" Does it include an amount equal to the net proceeds of the
gain, but not taken from the same fund or account? Suppose, for
example, the trust as a regular practice distributes, from an ac-
count kept for original corpus and accretions thereto of prior years,
an amount equal to the "exact net proceeds" of current capital
gains. Will such gains be considered paid? If so, how could this com-
port with the statement in the example that the gain therein was
not paid?
Furthermore, whatever be the answer to the last query, must the
regular practice be with respect to the precise amount of the net
proceeds? Suppose that all the facts of the example were repeated
in years 2, 3, 4 and 5, but that in year 2, $9,000 was distributed from
corpus, $5,000 in year 3, $1,000 in year 4, and $15,000 in year 5 (as-
suming here there was $5,000 additional cash on hand). Why should
the question whether any gain was paid in any of the five years turn
on whether the "exact net proceeds" of each year ($10,000), no
more, no less, were distributed each year?
In light of the above discussion, it would seem that the example
of the regulation is, in the main, too ambiguous to be useful and
where unambiguous, that is, in its statement regarding the outcome
of the given facts, probably incorrect. The most that could be said
for it is that it is at least an attempt to illustrate the principles of
paragraph (a) (3) of the regulation, but even this is not certain.
Coming back then to paragraph (a) (3), the question in order is
whether it, and the statement and the committee report on which it
is based, are justified by the statute, specifically by the word "paid"
in section 643(a) (3). This devolves to two inquiries: (1) will the
word "paid" linguistically support the concept of utilization (as-
suming, as would seem proper, that there are situations which
would clearly be seen as utilization) ?-and (2) would the purpose
of section 643(a) (3) be served by the concept of utilization?
The first question should probably be answered affirmatively.
Linguistic arguments supporting this result could certainly be made
although they probably would not be devastatingly persuasive.
Moreover, in the nature of things, the answer to the second question
largely determines the answer to the first, and the answer to tim
second, and realistically more important, question would seem to
be definitely yes. From our prior discussion, despite the difficulties
encountered or created by the courts, it would seem reasonably
clear that the design of the 1939 Code, and the 1942 amendments
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thereto, was to tax the tax income of the trust to those who bene-
fited by it. There is no reason to think that the design of the 1954
Code is any different. A beneficiary who is paid, in the discretion
of the trustee, or who has the right to be paid, ordinary income is
benefited by such income and is taxed on it. Similarly, a beneficiary
who is paid, in the discretion of the trustee, or who has the right to
be paid, the proceeds of capital gains is benefited by the gains and
is taxed on them. The utilization concept is just a logical extension
of this benefit principle. A person may not receive or have the right
to receive part or all of the net proceeds of the gain. But, if he re-
ceives or has the right to receive some distribution only because
there was a capital gain, or if his receipt or right of receipt is in
small or large part caused by the existence of such gains, then he
has in a realistic sense benefited to some extent by the gains.
To illustrate (and this is not to gainsay the problems inherent
in the utilization concept as delineated in paragraph (a) (3) of the
regulation) assume a trust provides: Income to A for life, principal
to B on A's death, capital gains to be considered principal; prin-
cipal may be invaded by the trustee if and only to the extent of
capital gains. If A is paid, from original corpus or original corpus
with accretions of prior years, an amount equal to the capital gain
of the current year, is it not clear that he, not B (i.e., the trust)
has benefited from the capital gain and is it not equally clear that
A, and not B (i.e., the trust), should pay the tax?
Summary and Some Comments on the Significance
of the "Taxable Year"
The income taxation of capital gains of a trust depends ulti-
mately on whether such gains are included in distributable net in-
come under section 643 (a) (3). In the relatively rare case of manda-
tory distribution of such gains, they are clearly so included. In the
case of discretionary distributions the question is one of the proper
interpretation of the phrase "properly paid [or] credited .. .
to any beneficiary during the taxable year." The conclusion of this
article is that this phrase should be interpreted to include capital
gains in distributable net income if a discretionary distribution is
traceable to the proceeds of a capital gain transaction, or if, and to
the extent that, such proceeds have been "utilized" by the fiduciary
in exercising his discretion to distribute. Neither of these criteria,
of course, can be applied with the ease or precision for which one
would hope. Their virtue lies rather in their being true to the gen-
eral principle of trust taxation under the prior law as well as the
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present Code, namely that a trust is treated as a conduit and the
beneficiaries are taxed on the tax income of a trust to the extent
that their distributions represent the passing of the benefit of such
income to them.
Finally, there should be noted an apparently permissible method
of insuring that the trust always bears the tax with respect to capi-
tal gains. In the prior discussion I have assumed that the capital
gains paid to the beneficiary (under either the tracing or utiliza-
tion tests) were paid during the same trust taxable year in which
they were realized. The situation would seem quite different, how-
ever, if that assumption were varied.
Recall that under section 643 (a) (3) capital gains realized by a
trust during its taxable year are excluded from distributable net
income "to the extent that such gains are allocated to corpus and
are not paid, credited, or required to be distributed to any
beneficiary during the taxable year." (Emphasis added.)
Suppose that a capital gain is realized by a trust in its first tax-
able year, but is paid to a beneficiary on the first day of the trust's
second taxable year. Under section 643(a) (3) it would seem that
the gain would not be included in distributable net income for
either year. It would not be included in distributable net income
for the first taxable year since it was not paid during that year. It
would not be included in distributable net income for the second
taxable year since it was not realized during that year. 0
This result is similar to that which prevailed in the case of the
so-called "Dean trust" under the unamended 1939 Code where
accumulated income of the trust's taxable year was paid a day
after that taxable year ended. Since at that time the beneficiary
was taxed only on amounts which were paid to him (or as to which
he had the right to be paid) during the trust's taxable year out
of the trust's income for that same taxable year, any income of a
trust's taxable year distributed to the beneficiary in the succeed-
ing taxable year of the trust was taxable to the trust in that prior
60 These results are not affected by section 662(c) which provides that.
If the taxable year of a beneficiary is different from that of the estate or trust
the amount to be included in the gross income of the beneficiary shall be based
on the distributable net income of the estate or trust and the amounts properly paid,
credited, or required to be distributed to the beneficiary during any taxable year
or years of the estate or trust ending within or nith his taxable year.
This section depends on distributable net income, and capital gains are in distributable
net income only if realized and paid during the same taxable year of the trust. Thus,
the fact that the trust and the beneficiaries may have different taxable years will not
render capital gains includable in distributable net income for any year as long is
they are not paid to the beneficiary during the same taxable year of the trust In which
they were realized.
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taxable year and distributed tax-free to the beneficiary. With re-
spect to ordinary tax income this device was no longer available
after the 1942 amendment and cannot be used under the 1954 Code.
Under the analysis set forth above, however, it would still appear
to be available with respect to capital gains."
6lNote that the throwback rules of sections 065-68 would not affect this device,
since they apply only to the distribution of prior "undistributed net income" vhich
is defined generally as the excess of distributable net income over distributions. Thus
where distributable net income does not include capital gains, the presence of capital
gains cannot contribute to undistributed net income.
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